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I. INTRODUCTION
Eastern bloc countries have undergone tremendous upheaval since
1989. These nations are struggling to recast their economies into sys-
tems driven by individuals instead of central bureaucracies. At the
same time, these countries are developing new, democratic institutions
of government. These changes, while highly desirable, are nonetheless
disruptive. For example, many of the countries are facing tremendously
hard times as they convert their economies. To soften the pain of his
country's transition, Lech Walesa, then-leader of Poland's Solidarity
trade union, came to the United States in 1989 seeking substantial eco-
nomic assistance.'
The United States responded using a "package approach" to the
problem of Eastern European conversion as former Secretary of State
James Baker described at a 1991 White House briefing:
[Y]ou cannot build a market economy by throwing money at a
disintegrating command economy, but you can help a market
economy develop by establishing the political and legal condi-
1. Poland, Hungary Aid Launched in 1989, XLV CONG. Q. ALMANAC 503, 517
(1990) [hereinafter Poland Aid].
(107)
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tions necessary for markets to flourish and to attract private
capital. It is our view that we can help through technical assis-
tance. We can help through know-how, and that's what our
package approach is intended to do.
2
The Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act of
1989 codified this approach. Faced with crushing budget deficits, there
was little U.S. interest in a full-scale recreation of the Marshall Plan.'
Instead, through SEED, President Bush and the Congress established
assistance programs primarily consisting of currency stabilization assis-
tance, development assistance for newly private entities, and technical
assistance as a means to support economic and political conversion.5
Consequently, this initiative resulted in comparatively small amounts of
direct financial assistance to the government of Poland.6 Instead, much
of the aid was channeled through multi-lateral institutions and through
newly created Enterprise Funds.7 The implicit message of SEED was
that, if fledgling democracies would adopt the ways of the West, then
further aid would follow."
2. Key Issues at G-7 Summit, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. 509, 509 (1991) (remarks
by Secretary of State James Baker).
3. Support for East Europe Democracy Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-179, 103
Stat. 1298 (1989) [hereinafter SEED].
4. After a protracted "bidding war," the final version of $938 million was much
less than what some Members had sought; nonetheless, the package more than doubled
the President's initial proposal. Poland Aid, supra note 1, at 503. The Marshall Plan,
named after Secretary of State George C. Marshall, provided over $12 billion between
1948 and 1952. JOHN SPANIER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 37
(8th ed. 1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 14-19.
5. See SEED, supra note 3, at tit. I-IV; see also infra text at pt. IV (describing
SEED's provisions in greater detail).
6. See id.; see also William C. Stone, Comment, Poland and Hungary: The
SEED Act as a United States Response to Democratic Reform, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
167, 175 (1990) (noting concerns that funds "could be misused").
7. Of the total $938 million authorization, the SEED Act directed that $200 mil-
lion be channelled into the multi-lateral currency stabilization fund created for Poland.
SEED, supra note 3, § 102(c)(2). The Act further authorized $300 million for the
creation of Enterprise Funds for Poland and Hungary. Id. § 201(b)(1)-(2). See also
infra text accompanying notes 114-29.
8. SEED, supra note 3, § 801 (directing the President to suspend all assistance in
the event that a recipient country violates certain conditions). The House Report ac-
companying the Act notes that "[tihis bill-conditions immediate U.S. assistance on
continued steps toward democracy and market-oriented economies through the imple-
mentation of comprehensive economic reform in both Poland and Hungary." H.R. REP.
No. 278, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
744, 745 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT, pt. 2]. See also infra text accompanying notes
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This Comment addresses issues raised by SEED's directives and,
in particular, the role of assistance mandated by SEED in driving the
evolution of political and economic institutions in Poland. To place
SEED's mandates in perspective, this Comment briefly reviews the his-
tory of U.S. development assistance in the context of objectives articu-
lated in both legislation and executive policy since the advent of the
Marshall Plan. This history provides an historical and legal context for
the subsequent discussion of development assistance, and specifically
the legal and practical effects of such assistance on Poland as man-
dated by SEED.
II. U.S. DEVELOPMENT POLICY: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BASES
Countries have been giving and receiving assistance to each other
throughout much of recorded history.9 Early forms of assistance in-
cluded the transfer of expertise for the construction of palaces, drain-
age systems, and ships.' 0 Later, in the nineteenth century, governments
in Europe raised funds to construct utilities and industrial plants in
countries such as Russia, Japan, Greece, Turkey, and other areas
around the globe that were newly open to external contact."' Much of
this assistance was financed either privately or from duties levied on
goods in the recipient countries or territories.'" However, there were no
massive government-led international development efforts until the
mid-1940s following World War II.'1
The end of World War II found the United States in a pre-emi-
nent position of global power, prestige and economic strength in which
the U.S. economy was vibrant and flush with resources and wealth. Eu-
rope, on the other hand, was floundering.' " The war years destroyed the
continent's economic infrastructure, and many U.S. officials feared a
power vacuum between the United States and the Soviet Union caused
166-67.
9. See MAURICE DOMERGUE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
POLICIES 1-3 (1968).
10. Id. at 2.
11. id.
12. Percy S. Mistry, Financing Development in the 1990s, in COOPERATION FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 98 (Robert J. Berg & David F. Gordon eds., 1989).
13. DOMERGUE, supra note 9, at 3.
14. Much of what Europe needed for its recovery could only be purchased from
the United States. At the same time, the U.S. economy possessed such sufficient quan-
tities of goods that it did not need to purchase much from Europe. This created what
came to be known as the "dollar gap." SPANIER, supra note 4, at 35.
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by Europe's devastation.1" The reconstruction of Europe, therefore, be-
came an important national priority.' 6
This priority led to the formulation of what later became known as
the Marshall Plan. Officially referred to as The Foreign Assistance Act
of 1948,'1 the initiative established the Economic Cooperation Agency
which was given responsibility for coordinating the distribution of vast
quantities of loan and grant assistance for Europe's recovery.18 The
Plan quickly proved to be a successful technique for economic
development. 9
The early and dramatic achievements of the Marshall Plan led the
Truman Administration to formulate a new program to promote devel-
opment in the newly independent former European colonies.20 Truman
announced his policy, the so-called "Point Four" program, in his 1949
inaugural address.2 Truman captured the optimism of the times when
he issued his call:
[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress avail-
able for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.
For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowl-
edge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, ch. 169, 1948 U.S.C.C.S. 145 (1948).
18. Id. at tit. I; see H.R. REP. No. 1585, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948), reprinted
in 1948 U.S.C.C.S. 1349.
19. Among the successes cited by one author:
By 1950 . .. Europe was already exceeding its prewar production by 25 per-
cent; two years later, this figure was 200 percent higher. English exports were
doing well, the French inflation was being slowed down, and German produc-
tion had reached Germany's 1936 level. The dollar gap had been reduced
from $12 billion to $2 billion. The Marshall Plan had been a massive success,
and at a cost that represented only a tiny fraction of the U.S. national income
over the same four-year period; it was, indeed, smaller than America's liquor
bill for these same years!
SPANIER, supra note 4, at 38.
20. See NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, FOREIGN AID AND AMERICAN PURPOSE 25-26
(1988). In fact, Eberstadt suggests that European successes may have misled support-
ers of foreign aid into believing that such assistance "naturally wedded" frequently
disparate "strategic, economic, and humanitarian objectives." Id. at 24.
21. See Harry S Truman, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1949), in 1949 PUB. PA-
PERS 112 (1964).
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The United States is preeminent among nations in the de-
velopment of industrial and scientific techniques. The material
resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other
peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in techni-
cal knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving
peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order
to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in
cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital invest-
ment in areas needing development.22
The Point Four program consisted almost exclusively of technical
assistance for the recipient countries. 3 The Technical Cooperation Ad-
ministration (TCA) was organized in 1950 to implement the pro-
gram.24 The TCA coordinated assistance efforts provided by govern-
ment agencies and funded contracts with Private Voluntary
Organizations (PVOs) to provide services to recipient countries.2 5 Ini-
tially, the Point Four program did not overtly focus its assistance on
the basis of political imperatives. However, a commission headed by
Nelson Rockefeller in 1953 recommended that U.S. assistance be
linked to security concerns.26 Thus, the locus of U.S. efforts was con-
sciously shifted to the needs of the less developed world with an empha-
sis on those countries in areas of special security concern to the United
States.27
In the mid-1950s, at a time when there were substantial food sur-
pluses in the United States, Congress enacted the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954.28 This legislation created the
food aid programs collectively known as "P.L. 480" or "Food for
Peace."2 There are three major components to the P.L. 480 program:
concessional government-to-government sales of food surpluses with
very lenient repayment terms; food donations to support school feeding
22. Id. at 114.
23. E. BOYD WENNERGREN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD POVERTY
35 (1989).
24. BRIAN H. SMITH, MORE THAN ALTRUISM: THE POLITICS OF PRIVATE FOREIGN
AID 50 (1990).
25. Id.
26. WENNERGREN, supra note 23, at 35-36.
27. Id. at 36.
28. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-
480, 68 Stat. 454 (1954). See also EBERSTADT, supra note 20, at 28-30.
29. WENNERGREN, supra note 23, at 41.
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or food-for-work programs; and concessional sales with debt forgiveness
where proceeds from the sale of the food are used for approved devel-
opment projects.30 The broad policy objectives include prioviding mar-
kets for United States farmers, encouraging development in recipient
countries, providing humanitarian assistance, and furthering United
States foreign policy interests. 1
The next major development initiative came with the passage of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA).3 2 The FAA created the
Agency for International Development (AID) which continues to be
the principal agency responsible for the administration of U.S. foreign
assistance programs.3  The forms of aid primarily consist of economic
assistance, food aid, and security assistance.3 4 Economic assistance en-
compasses grants, loans, and technical assistance. 5 AID also jointly
administers, along with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
food aid under the P.L. 480 program.31 Security assistance, allocated
largely on the basis of U.S. security interests, includes aid programs
such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), the Military Assistance Pro-
gram (MAP), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF).37
Since AID's inception, there have been some substantial shifts in
its objectives and congressional involvement. Until 1973, AID pro-
grams were largely geared towards supporting economic growth initia-
30. Issues Related to the Reauthorization of Food for Peace and Agricultural
Export Promotion Programs: Hearings and Markup before the Comm. on Foreign
Affairs and its Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House
of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990) (testimony of Allan I.
Mendelowitz).
31. Id. at 25-26.
32. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 1961 Stat. 470 (1961)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
33. Id.
34. WENNERGREN, supra note 23, at 43.
35. Id. at 43-44.
36. Id. at 41.
37. Id. at 44. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are authorized to foreign govern-
ments when such sales are consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests, foreign assis-
tance goals, the purchasing country's military needs, its economic condition, and the
prevention of arms races. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2751(a) (1990 & Supp. 1993); see also
22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2761-2770 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth FMS procedures and
rules). The Economic Support Fund (ESF) provides financial assistance under "special
economic, political, or security conditions" to countries when such assistance may not
be justifiable under the development assistance provisions of the Foreign Assistance
Act. 22 U.S.C. § 2346(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991). Military assistance in the form of
grants or loans is authorized "to any friendly country or international organization, the
assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States.
." 22 U.S.C. § 2311(a) (1988).
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tives including large capital intensive projects that, according to Con-
gress' findings, failed to meet the needs of the poorest of the world's
poor. 8 Based on these conclusions, Congress mandated that AID shift
its programmatic emphasis following the so-called "New Directions"
initiative.3 9 Consequently, AID was required to begin selecting coun-
tries and programs that would meet basic human needs including "food
production; rural development and nutrition; population planning and
health; and education, public administration, and human resource.
development. '"0
The Carter Administration implemented these priorities while also
placing considerable emphasis on human rights and human needs as a
predicate for the provision of aid. 1 The Reagan Administration, how-
ever, fundamentally changed the direction and rationale for its assis-
tance policies. While the basic needs criteria remained in place, the
Reagan Administration reasserted the dominant role of security con-
cerns over humanitarian and economic concerns.4 2 This policy stressed
market economies, structural reform for recipients, and greater reliance
on private sources of aid.4 Permeating the Reagan approach was an
overtly ideological and geopolitical rationale for assistance decisions in
which security assistance programs greatly exceeded appropriations for
economic assistance. 4
The Reagan Administration also saw the rise of the notion of "pol-
icy dialogue, '4 5 an AID term for the process of driving recipient coun-
try economic policies through the structuring of assistance packages. "
38. H.R. REP. No. 388, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2806, 2816.
39. ELIZABETH MORRISON & RANDALL B. PURCELL, PLAYERS & ISSUES IN U.S.
FOREIGN AID 7 (1988).
40. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 102(b)(2), 87 Stat.
714 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 782.
41. MORRISON & PURCELL, supra note 39, at 8.
42. Id.
43. EBERSTADT, supra note 20, at 49-50.
44. MORRISON & PURCELL, supra note 39, at 8. For example, security assistance
represented 45 % of foreign aid in FY 1980. It grew to 62 % in the administration's FY
1987 budget request. Id. One commentator observed that, despite this proportionate
expansion of security assistance, Reagan's promise to realign assistance priorities with
ideological objectives rang hollow: "If the rhetoric of the Carter commissions ... had
been carefully airbrushed out of AID's public statements in the 1984 election year,
such thinking was still clearly acceptable in the inner recesses of the Reagan adminis-
tration's development apparatus." EBERSTADT, supra note 20, at 57.
45. Lynne D. Finney, Development Assistance: A Tool of Foreign Policy, 15
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 213, 242-43 (1983).
46. Id.
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This notion has brought about considerable controversy. "' One view
suggests that the United States should not impose its economic policies
upon a country in need. 8 The other view argues that common sense
should dictate that a donor of assistance bears the responsibility to en-
sure that the recipient uses the assistance in a manner that will ensure
its success.49 One commentator, however, suggests that realities will
prevent the United States from imposing a particular approach on a
country:
Identity comes first; economic choices follow. Designing effec-
tive development strategies will never be an act of pure eco-
nomic technique and rationality. They must embody hopes, en-
hance identity, and inspire the spirit to 'compel belief,' gain
support, and affect reality. The single-recipe approach is
doomed to failure in an increasingly self-conscious world. Dif-
ferentiating the U.S. approach to development strategies rather
than standardizing it is an essential element for U.S. develop-
ment cooperation to succeed in the 1990s.50
The Bush Administration's posture on the broad goals of U.S. for-
eign assistance was premised on a "tradition of humanitarian concern.
• . combined with an active promotion of our national interests." 51 The
provision of foreign assistance was guided by six principles:
* Support for free markets and broadbased economic growth;
* Concern for individuals and the development of their eco-
nomic and social well-being;
" Support for democracy;
* Encouragement of responsible environmental policies and pru-
dent management of natural resources;
* Support for lasting solutions to transnational problems; and
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Colin I. Bradford, Shaping a U.S. Approach to the 1990s: "Reading Reality
Right," in COOPERATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 12, at 203,
209.
51. Overview of Foreign Assistance: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment; African Affairs; and East
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7-8 (1991) [hereinafter Foreign Assistance Hearings] (testimony of Ronald W.
Roskens, Administrator, AID).
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* Provision of humanitarian assistance to those who suffer from
natural or man-made disasters. 2
As it sought to implement these principles, AID began to place greater
significance on "sound economic policies and improved governance in
developing countries as a critical basis for sustained, broadbased
growth." '53
Simultaneous with the evolution of these policies under successive
administrations, Congress increasingly has expanded its control over
foreign assistance by imposing rigorous reporting requirements and by
"earmarking" funds for specific programs .' Earmarking restricts funds
to specific countries and projects, and, in 1989, almost half of develop-
ment assistance funds were earmarked pursuant to Congressional direc-
tive. 6 The reporting burdens are astounding: "In 1985 alone, USAID
provided 849 congressional notifications totaling 1,700 pages. The
agency estimates that it devotes more than 200 person-years per year
to its interaction with the Congress. '"66 Such restrictions and require-
ments have been a subject of great irritation to AID and State Depart-
ment officials.6 " The Bush Administration, for example, took the posi-
tion that reporting requirements and congressional earmarks imposed
considerable burdens and tied up funds, despite the fact that conditions
could change quickly. 8
The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe shocked this policymak-
ing structure, forcing Congress and the executive agencies to respond
quickly in an extremely fluid policy milieu.59 Turf rivalries between the
52. Id. at 8.
53. id. at 7.
54. Bruce W. Jentleson, American Diplomacy: Around the World and Along
Pennsylvania Avenue, in A QUESTION OF BALANCE: THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS,
AND FOREIGN POLICY 146, 172 (Thomas E. Mann ed., 1990).
55. Id. at 173. Security assistance was almost completely earmarked: "98 percent
of the economic support fund and 92 percent of military aid was earmarked." Id. Jen-
tleson describes earmarking as "the foreign aid equivalent of domestic entitlements."
Id. at 172.
56. Allan Hoben, USAID: Organizational and Institutional Issues and Effective-
ness, in COOPERATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 12, at 253,
273. "Only the Department of Defense has more [reporting requirements], yet it has a
budget fifty times greater." Jentleson, supra note 54, at 174 (citing Lee H. Hamilton,
To Make Foreign Aid Work, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1989, at C7).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Poland Aid, supra note 1, at 506. Congressman David Obey observed that
"Itihis is the time to move as quickly as possible in providing the kind of assistance to
Poland that can in fact give those political reforms the breathing room they need to
19931
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executive and legislative branches exerted great influence over the de-
sign and implementation of U.S. efforts to assist the newly emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe. 0
III. EASTERN EUROPE'S SITUATION: THE EXAMPLE OF POLAND
"Making eggs out of an omelet" is how one official described the
situation currently facing Eastern Europe."1 The economic, social, and
political problems facing the newly emerging democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe have never before been encountered. The chal-
lenges in Poland, the largest of the Eastern European countries, 2 typi-
fied the circumstances in the entire region. Under communist rule since
1947, an opposition coalition led by the Solidarity labor union formed a
government headed by non-communists in 1989.63 Citizens voted in
free local elections in May 1990, and in the following December, they
chose Lech Walesa to be the first President ever elected by the peo-
ple. 4 Walesa succeeded General Wojciech Jaruzelski, 65 who had im-
posed martial law and jailed many of Solidarity's leaders during the
course of the union's decade-long challenge to communist authority.66
A combination of forces led to the dismantling of the communist
regime in Poland. Vast numbers of Poles followed Solidarity's bold
leadership to "openly challeng[e] Poland's entire political, economic
succeed." Id.
60. The process of crafting the aid package for Poland was described as a "bid-
ding war" between Congress, the administration and the two parties. Id. at 503. Frus-
trations and anxieties over the situation among Members of Congress were high at
times, prompting Congressman Lee Hamilton to say, "[t]here is a real-difference in my
assessment of the problem and the administration's assessment .... I feel a sense of
urgency here. The administration seems relaxed about this." Id. at 512.
61. Robert L. Barry, Priorities of US Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe:
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1991, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. 286, 288
(1991).
62. Poland encompasses an area of about 120,725 square miles (312,680 square
kilometers) and has a population of 37.8 million. Country Profile: Poland, 2 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH. 208, 208 (1991) [hereinafter Country Profile]. The other countries of East-
ern Europe include the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. U.S.
GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EASTERN EUROPE DONOR ASSISTANCE AND REFORM EF-
FORTS, PUB. No. GAO/NSIAD-91-21, at 9-10 (1990) [hereinafter DONOR
ASSISTANCE].
63. Country Profile, supra note 62, at 208.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Abraham Brumberg, Poland: The Demise of Communism, 69 FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS: AMERICA & THE WORLD 1990, at 70, 75 (1990).
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and social system."167 The Polish government responded by imposing
martial law in December of 1981.68 Over the course of the decade, the
government's ability to constrain the aspirations of the people ebbed
and flowed. 69 Ultimately, popular support rallied behind Solidarity,
leading to the call for elections and the "roundtable" negotiation in
1989 between the government and opposition leaders."0 At the same
time, Jaruzelski's government was receiving less support from the Sovi-
ets under Mikhail Gorbachev.7 1 Gorbachev's policies, known collec-
tively as perestroika, called for substantial restructuring of economic
organization.7 2 This restructuring, combined with the rise of glasnost,
or openness, created great instability in the Soviet regime making it
less able to shore up allies who had relied on it for over forty years.73
Consequently, a political and military power vacuum forced the
Jaruzelski government to negotiate power sharing arrangements with
Solidarity that eventually resulted in the ouster of the communist
party.74 The new government quickly revised the constitution, boldly
set out to dismantle and privatize the state-owned enterprises, and be-
gan the painful process of converting to a market economy.76
The transition could not have been more dramatic. While under
communist rule, enterprises were operated as large, centrally-controlled
monopolies.7 6 Production decisions were made in Warsaw and transmit-
ted to plant managers based on what central planners felt was
needed.7 Planners, rather than the market, set prices. 8 Increases in
production were achieved through infusions of labor rather than greater
efficiency.7 9 For example, one Polish steel plant required 30,000 work-
ers to manufacture the same amount of steel as a U.S. plant employing
7,000 workers.80
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 73-74.
70. Id. at 79.
71. Michael Howard, The Springtime of Nations, 69 FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AMERICA
& THE WORLD 1990, at 17, 22 (1990).
72. Marshall I. Goldman, Gorbachev the Economist, 69 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring
1990, at 28, 28 (1990).
73. Id. "
74. See Brumberg, supra note 66, at 79.
75. Country Profile, supra note 62, at 208.
76. DONOR ASSISTANCE, supra note 62, at 27.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 27.
80. Id. at 29.
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Central ownership of economic enterprises also meant that nations
like Poland did not have institutions that many in the West take for
granted. For example, during the communist tenure there were no
stock or commodities exchanges; banking was a state function. 8 1 As a
result, there were no existing institutions through which to channel pri-
vate investment. Even more stultifying was that the Polish simply did
not have experience with the basics of owning property, negotiating
contracts, or making economic choices based on a system of pricing
that reflected costs, supplies and demand rather than bureaucratic
fiat.8 2
Exacerbating the inefficiencies of central control was the isolation
of Poland and the other Eastern European economies. All were mem-
bers of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), 83 the
Soviet dominated trade body of the communist bloc nations, which
managed a system of arrangements among its members that provided
for the transfer of capital, commodities and other products. 8 These ar-
rangements effectively placed the member nations outside of the inter-
national trading system except when purchasing goods unavailable
within Comecon. 8 Poland's limited dealings with the West, nonethe-
less, led to a crushing debt burden due to the lack of a convertible
currency.8" Isolation insulated the economy from international competi-
tion, reduced access to consumer goods, and exacerbated the already
low incentive to produce quality products.87
The painful process of converting and reintegrating the Polish
economy began in 1989 under the newly elected Polish government led
by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. 88 The "Balcerowicz Plan,"
named for Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, charted the
81. Id. at 31.
82. See generally Jeffrey Sachs & David Lipton, Poland's Economic Reform, 69
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1990, at 47 (1990).
83. DONOR ASSISTANCE, supra note 62, at 30.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Poland's external debt was over $46 billion as of 1989-1990. In 1989 debt
service payments exceeded $5 billion, more than half of the hard currency value of
Poland's exports. Poland's creditor governments (known collectively as the Paris Club)
restructured Poland's debt schedule on numerous occasions and have agreed to excuse
at least 50% of Poland's debt to them. Country Profile, supra note 62, at 209.
87. Sachs & Lipton, supra note 82, at 49. In addition, almost all imports and
exports had to be centrally approved. Frequently, the importing that did occur was
conducted by a centralized enterprise preventing individual firms from establishing con-
tacts with firms in more advanced countries. This effectively cut the vast majority of
the economy off from the benefits of technology transfer. Id. at 49-50.
88. Id. at 48.
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course for economic reform.8 9 The plan lifted price controls, eliminated
rationing of consumer goods and services, and initiated the process of
privatization." Some referred to the plan as a form of "shock ther-
apy." 9' The lifting of controls caused a tremendous increase in
prices-inflation exceeded an annual rate of 2000 % during the second
half of 1989.92 Yet, other aspects of the plan have comparatively
calmed inflation to the point that it is expected to be roughly 40% in
1993. 1
The Polish Parliament began constructing a new legal framework
for a market economy that included converting the banking system."
The Polish National Bank was restructured into a Western style "two
tiered" system in which the central bank regulates privately owned
banks engaging in traditional commercial bank activity such as main-
taining accounts and issuing loans. 5
Poland began privatization efforts by selling shares in a small
number of enterprises on a newly created stock exchange."6 Other ini-
tiatives led to the transfer of shops, wholesale and retail enterprises,
and other smaller firms.9 Despite these transfers, most of Poland's do-
mestic output continues to be generated by state-run enterprises.98 Sev-
eral proposals for accelerated privatization are pending. 9
To facilitate this entire transition, Polish leaders requested assis-
tance from the international community, specifically seeking substan-
tial reductions in Poland's external debt, assistance to promote convert-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 55.
91. Jim McNitt. Poland's Bold Leap, in Poland: A New Era of Opportunity,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1991, at special advertising sec. following 16.
92. Id.
93. Coopers & Lybrand, Eastern European Business & Investment Guide; Po-
land, Jan. 28, 1993, § 1, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Poland File [hereinafter
Coopers & Lybrand].
94. Id. § 3.4.
95. Jim McNitt, Building Commercial Banking in Poland: A New Era of Oppor-
tunity, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1991, at special advertising sec. following 16.
96. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 93, § 3.4. The exchange is housed symboli-
cally on the top floor of the old communist party headquarters. Jim McNitt, Mile-
stones of Polish History, Science & Culture, in Poland: A New Era of Opportunity,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1991, at special advertising sec. following 16.
97. Coopers & Lybrand,,supra note 93, § 3.3.
98. Id. § 3.7 (The private sector accounts for 22-23% of Gross Domestic
Product).
99. Sachs & Lipton, supra note 82, at 61. This is proving to be an extraordinarily
difficult issue for the Polish government since there is little consensus over who truly
owns existing enterprises and who should own them in the future. Id.
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ibility of Poland's currency, the zloty, and assistance in the form of
grants, loans, and technical assistance to ease market conversion and to
promote the modernization of Poland's economic infrastructure.' 10
IV. PRovIsIoNs OF THE SEED ACT
Following a dramatic visit by Lech Walesa, 1°1 Congress passed the
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989,102 author-
izing an extensive package of assistance designed to aid the conversion
of the Polish and Hungarian economies to a free market system. The
legislation called for programs that would facilitate structural adjust-
ment, private sector development, trade and investment, cultural and
educational exchanges, and the development of democratic institu-
tions.103 The final Act was an amended version of an alternative pack-
age proposed by fifty-eight House members in October of 1989.0 The
House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported that the final package
combined provisions of a package proposed by President Bush and sev-
eral other proposals passed earlier by the House.105
A. Legislative Objectives
SEED mandated that "the United States shall implement ...a
concerted Program of Support for East European Democracy .... The
SEED program shall be . ..designed to provide cost-effective assis-
tance to those countries of Eastern Europe that have taken substantive
steps toward institutionalizing political democracy and economic plu-
ralism." 106 The Act called upon the President to ensure that the assis-
tance achieve objectives among three broad categories. 10 7 First, assis-
tance was intended to promote the expansion of democracy
characterized by representative governments that are freely elected. 08
Included in this was a recognition of the importance of free speech, the
operation of a free press, and the establishment of independent judici-
100. See id. at 64.
101. 135 CONG. REC. H8,632-35 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1989) (address by
Solidarnosc Chairman Lech Walesa to joint meeting of the House and Senate).
102. SEED, supra note 3.
103. H.R. REP. No. 278, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 739, 739-40 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT, pt. 1].
104. HOUSE REPORT, pt. 2, supra note 8, at 4, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 746.
105. Id., 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 746-47.
106. SEED, supra note 3, § 2(a), 103 Stat. at 1299.
107. Id. § 2(b)(1)-(3), 103 Stat. at 1299-1300.
108. Id. § 2(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 1299.
1993] DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1989
ary and military structures.1"9
The second broad goal called for assistance to promote the devel-
opment of open markets.11 These markets were to embrace notions of
private property in which privatized enterprises traded with each other
freely, both domestically and internationally."' The capital markets
were to be privately operated, and businesses to be freed from undue
regulatory barriers." 2
Finally, the Act mandated that assistance not provide support to
political parties that lacked commitment to democratic ide-
als-specifically the Communist Party."13 Assistance also was specifi-
cally prohibited from providing benefits to the military forces of War-
saw Pact nations.1"
109. Id.
110. Id. § 2(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 1299-1300.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. § 2(b)(3), 103 Stat. at 1300.
114. Id. § 2(b)(3)(B), 103 Stat. at 1300. The legislative objectives are set forth as
follows:
(1) to contribute to the development of democratic institutions and political
pluralism characterized by-
(A) the establishment of fully democratic and representative politi-
cal systems based on free and fair elections,
(B) effective recognition of fundamental liberties and individual
freedoms, including freedom of speech, religion and association,
(C) termination of all laws and regulations which impede the opera-
tion of a free press and the formation of political parties,
(D) creation of an independent judiciary, and
(E) establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police
forces;
(2) to promote the development of a free market economic system character-
ized by-
(A) privatization of economic entities,
(B) establishment of full rights to acquire and hold private property,
including land and the benefits of contractual relations,
(C) simplification of regulatory controls regarding the establishment
and operation of businesses,
(D) dismantlement of all wage and price controls,
(E) removal of trade restrictions, including on both imports and
exports,
(F) liberalization of investment and capital, including the repatria-
tion of profits by foreign investors,
(G) tax policies which provide incentives for economic activity and
investment,
(H) establishment of rights to own and operate private banks and
other financial service firms, as well as unrestricted access to private
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B. Structural Adjustment Provisions
Title I of the Act authorized outlays directed towards structural
adjustment."' Section 101 directed the government to play a leader-
ship role in the development of assistance packages, debt relief, and
other programs in international organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD)."' Such programs
would be intended to support the Polish government's plan for attack-
ing hyperinflation, relieving balance of payments problems, and carry-
ing out structural reforms.1
7
Section 102 authorized $200 million in Economic Support Funds
as the U.S. contribution to a $1 billion multilateral currency stabiliza-
tion fund.11 8 Section 103 authorized the provision of food and agricul-
tural commodities to alleviate shortages. 19 It directed that the expendi-
ture not be less than $125 million.' Such assistance, however, was to
provide quantities of food that would eliminate shortages and ease in-
flation but not impair the development of private agricultural produc-
tion by removing profit incentives.' 2 ' Finally, the structural adjustment
provisions directed the President to investigate debt-for-equity swaps as
a means to reduce debt burdens.' 22
C. Private Sector Initiatives
Private sector development was the principal focus of Title II of
the Act, and contained the largest single spending authoriza-
sources of credit, and
(I) access to a market for stocks, bonds, and other instruments
through which individuals may invest in the private sector; and
(3) not to contribute any substantial benefit-
(A) to Communist or other political parties or organizations which
are not committed to respect for the democratic process, or
(B) to the defense or security forces of any member country of the
Warsaw Pact.
Id. § 2(b), 103 Stat. at 1299-1300.
115. Id. at tit. I, § 101, 103 Stat. at 1302. Structural adjustment policies are
intended to "lead to long-term internal and external balance, such as divestiture of
unprofitable public sector enterprises." DONOR AssISTANCE, supra note 62, at 15 n.2.
116. SEED, supra note 3, at tit. I, § 101, 103 Stat. at 1302.
117. Id.
118. Id. at tit. I, § 102, 103 Stat. at 1303.
119. Id. at tit. I, § 103, 103 Stat. at 1303-04.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at tit. I, § 104, 103 Stat. at 1304-05.
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tion--creation and funding of the Polish-American Enterprise Fund.12 1
The Act authorized $240 million for the Fund intended to promote:
(1) the development of the Polish . . . private sectors, in-
cluding small businesses, the agricultural sectors, and joint ven-
tures with United States and host country participants, and
(2) policies and practices conducive to private sector devel-
opment in Poland ... through loans, grants, equity investments,
feasibility studies, technical assistance, training, insurance,
guarantees, and other measures. 2 "
The Fund, established as a private entity, would receive its initial fund-
ing via the Agency for International Development.' 25
For programs or projects to be eligible, their goals were required
to be consistent with the purposes of the Fund.'26 Explicitly approved
were programs to establish Employee Stock Ownership Plans, en-
courage the development of credit unions, and modernize telecommuni-
cations technology. 2 ' The Fund also was directed explicitly to consider
factors such as workers' rights, environmental effects, and commercial
viability in determining whether or not to approve a project. 2 8 The Act
also required the Fund to report to Congress and to be audited by inde-
pendent accounting firms and the General Accounting Office
(GAO). 29 Any organization that received money from the Fund also
was required to maintain detailed, separate accounts subject to
audit. 3 '
Other sections of Title II authorized funding for technical assis-
tance in the areas of labor market transition and private sector develop-
ment. '3 An authorization of $4 million was designated for the Secre-
tary of Labor to provide assistance regarding employee training and
retraining, job search and employment services, unemployment com-
pensation, occupational safety and health protection, labor-manage-
123. Id. at tit. II, § 201, 103 Stat. at 1305. This provision also allocated $40
million for the creation of the Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund. Id. at tit. II,
§ 201 (b)(2), 103 Stat. at 1305.
124. Id. at tit. II, § 201(a), 103 Stat. at 1305.
125. Id. at tit. II, § 201(0, 103 Stat. at 1306.
126. Id. at tit. II, § 201(f)(1), 103 Stat. at 1306.
127. Id. at tit. II, § 201(f)(1)-(5), 103 Stat. at 1306.
128. Id. at tit. II, § 201(g), 103 Stat. at 1306.
129. Id. at tit. II, § 201(m)-(p), 103 Stat. at 1307-08.
130. Id. at tit. 1I, § 201(o), 103 Stat. at 1307.
131. Id. at tit. II, §§ 202, 203, 103 Stat. 1308-10.
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ment relations, market driven wage systems, worker's rights, and other
matters.1"2 AID received a $10 million authorization for the purpose of
designing and implementing technical assistance programs for private
sector development."' AID was directed to coordinate and cooperate
with other agencies such as the Agriculture Department, the Farmer-
to-Farmer program, the Enterprise Funds, and other public and private
entities." 4 Finally, the Act authorized an additional $6 million for the
Peace Corps to conduct programs to provide training in the English
language and private sector development. 135
D. Trade Initiatives
Initiatives in Title III of- the Act granted tariff concessions and
provided financing authority to foster trade between the United States
and Poland."3 6 The Act extended eligibility to Poland for special treat-
ment of some Polish exports to the United States under the Genera-
lized System of Preferences. 37 Such treatment, normally reserved for
developing countries, permits reduced tariffs on exports of raw materi-
als and semifinished goods. 38 Section 303 authorized the Export-Im-
port Bank of the United States to "guarantee, insure, finance, extend
credit, and participate in the extension of credit in connection with the
purchase or lease of any [Polish or Hungarian] product.' 39 The Act
authorized the President to provide short-term guarantees through the
Export-Import Bank to finance the export of goods for private sector
132. Id. at tit. I, § 202(a)-(b), (g), 103 Stat. at 1308.
133. Id. at tit. II, § 203, 103 Stat. at 1309-10.
134. Id. at tit. II, § 203, 103 Stat. at 1309. Several organizations, programs, and
agencies are explicitly listed as candidates for such projects. Id. The House Report
devoted considerable attention to the nature and content of AID programs to provide
agricultural and managerial technical assistance. HousE REPORT, pt. 2, supra note 8,
at 10, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 753. The report stated that the statute "mentioned these
particular organizations and programs because of the critical role the [House Foreign
Affairs] committee believes [the organizations] can play in helping Poland and Hun-
gary develop a market based economy." Id.
135. SEED, supra note 3, at tit. II, § 204, 103 Stat. at 1310.
136. Id. at tit. III, §§ 301-307, 103 Stat, at 1311-14.
137. Id. at tit. III, § 301, 103 Stat. at 1311.
138. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was formulated to serve as an
economic development tool by providing duty-free access to United States markets for
developing countries. HOUSE REPORT, pt. 1, supra note 103, at 2, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 741. The President was authorized to grant tariff concessions to countries provided
that they were not, as in the case of Poland, specifically excluded from participation in
the program. Id. This section removes Poland from the statutory exclusion list. Id.; see
also Poland Aid, supra note 1, at 504.
139. SEED, supra note 3, at tit. III, § 303(a), 103 Stat. at 1312.
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use in Poland." ' These guarantees capped at $200 million during any
fiscal year."4
Title III also authorized $6 million to expand the Trade and De-
velopment Program into Poland and Hungary. " 2 In addition, the Presi-
dent was urged to negotiate treaties that would lead to a more stable
legal framework for United States investment in Poland and Hun-
gary.143 Finally, Title III amended the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to per-
mit Poland to sell bonds at below-market interest rates in the United
States.1 44
E. Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Programs
Title IV authorized funding and directed the administration to im-
plement educational, cultural, and scientific programs.14 5 Section 401
authorized $12 million to the United States Information Agency
(USIA) for programs that promote educational and cultural ex-
changes.' 46 These activities, whose principal emphasis would be to as-
sist in developing business and economic skills for the free market envi-
ronment, would use "the full array of existing . . . programs." ' "7 The
section also called upon the President to "encourage the establishment
140. Id. at tit. 11, § 304, 103 Stat. at 1312.
141. Id. at tit. II, § 304(a), 103 Stat. at 1313 (adding new § 225(g) following
existing § 224 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2184)
(1988)).
142. Id. at tit. III, § 305, 103 Stat. at 1314. The Trade and Development pro-
gram was created as an independent agency separate from AID "to provide informa-
tion to persons in the private sector concerning trade development and export promo-
tion" to developing countries. The program was initiated in 1974 as an amendment to
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. See 22 U.S.C. § 2421 (1990).
143. Id. at tit. III,§ 306, 103 Stat. at 1314.
144. Id. at tit. III,§ 307, 103 Stat. at 1314. Previously, only Israel was allowed to
seek American investment at discount rates without running afoul of Internal Revenue
Service regulations. Poland Aid, supra note 1, at 504. See 26 U.S.C. § 7872 (1988).
145. SEED, supra note 3, at tit. IV, §§ 401-403, 103 Stat. at 1314-17.
146. Id. at tit. IV, § 401(e), 103 Stat. at 1315.
147. Id. at tit. IV, § 401(a), 103 Stat. at 1315. A number of programs are men-
tioned for special emphasis including:
[the] J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange Program, the International
Visitors Program, the Samantha Smith Memorial Exchange Program, the ex-
change programs of the National Academy of Sciences, youth and student
exchanges through such organizations as The Experiment in International
Living, The American Field Service Committee, Youth for Understanding,
and research exchanges sponsored by the International Research and Ex-
changes Board (IREX).
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of 'sister institution' programs" between Polish, Hungarian, and Amer-
ican cities, universities, and organizations in the fields of health care,
business, environmental protection, and agricultural research." 8
Section 402 created a scholarship program to enable Polish and
Hungarian students to attend United States educational institutions. 14 9
This provision authorized $10 million over a three year period to AID's
Administrator to provide state grants for scholarships.15 0 As in the case
of the exchange programs, the Act directed that special emphasis be
given to the areas of business and economics.151
In section 403, the Act provided for scientific and technology ex-
change programs. 15 The section authorized $5.5 million and $2.5 mil-
lion for programs directed to Poland and Hungary, respectively. 15 Spe-
cifically, in the case of Poland, the funds were allocated to the
Secretary of State to implement a United States-Polish agreement con-
cerning scientific and technical cooperation.154 While section 403 does
not direct the Secretary to take any specific actions, a commission
formed to guide the implementation of the 1987 agreement had been
under-utilized according to the House Report. 15 That commission, the
report suggested, should be given the responsibility for evaluating and
recommending ways "in which joint cooperation in science and technol-
ogy may more effectively promote economic and political reform in
Poland.' 58
F. Miscellaneous Provisions
Title V authorized other assistance programs to support the devel-
opment of democratic institutions, promote environmental initiatives,
and to provide medical supplies and training.157 Section 501 designated
$12 million of Economic Support Funds (ESF) to promote democratic
institutions and activities. 58 Section 502 allotted funds to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy
148. Id. at tit. IV, § 401(d), 103 Stat. at 1315.
149. Id. at tit. IV, § 402, 103 Stat. at 1315-16.
150. Id. at tit. IV, § 402(i), 103 Stat. at 1316.
151. Id. at tit. IV, § 402(b), 103 Stat. at 1315.
152. Id. at tit. IV, § 403, 103 Stat. at 1316-17.
153. Id. at tit. IV, § 403(a)-(b), 103 Stat. at 1316.
154. Id. at tit. IV, § 403(c)(1), 103 Stat. at 1316.
155. HOUSE REPORT, pt. 2, supra note 8, at 14, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 757.
156. Id.
157. SEED, supra note 3, at tit. V, §§ 501-503, 103 Stat. at 1317-19.
158. Id. at tit. V, § 501, 103 Stat. at 1317. The Economic Support Fund is codi-
fied at 22 U.S.C. § 2346 (1988).
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(DOE)15 9 in recognition of "the severe pollution problems facing Po-
land and Hungary . *". ."'60 The bill provided highly specific instruc-
tions. For example, the EPA was directed to establish an air quality
monitoring network and improve water quality in Krakow. 16 The DOE
was directed "to retrofit a coal-fired commercial powerplant in the Kra-
kow . . . region with advanced clean coal technology."' 62 Finally, sec-
tion 503 authorized $4 million for medical supplies and equipment pro-
vided through private entities and the training of medical personnel in
Poland. 113
Titles VI and VII contained miscellaneous provisions concerning
various policy objectives and establishing reporting requirements.164 Ti-
tle VI directed the President to designate an official within the State
Department to be responsible for implementing and coordinating the
SEED Program.1 65 Other sections required the creation of a SEED in-
formation system and encouraged private voluntary assistance."66 Title
VII directed the President to provide a number of reports to Congress
concerning progress towards reform and an overall annual status report
on SEED program assistance.1 7
Finally, Title VIII contained the Act's strong suggestion that
SEED assistance be terminated in the event that certain conditions are
violated. 68 If a recipient country engages in activities that are "con-
trary to United States national security interests," institutes martial
law for reasons other than natural disaster or foreign invasion, or
removes a member of parliament from office for "extraconstitutional"
reasons, the President "should suspend all assistance" upon the deter-
mination and notification of the situation to Congress.169
159. Id. at tit. V, § 502(e), 103 Stat. at 1317 (authorizing funds for EPA activi-
ties); tit. V, § 502(f)(1), 103 Stat. at 1318 (authorizing funds for DOE activities).
160. Id. at tit. V, § 502(a), 103 Stat. at 1317.
161. Id. at tit. V, § 502(c)(1)-(2), 103 Stat. at 1317.
162. Id. at tit. V, § 502(f)(1), 103 Stat. at 1318.
163. Id. at tit. V, § 503, 103 Stat. at 1318-19.
164. Id. at tits. VI-VII, §§ 601-706, 103 Stat. at 1319-21.
165. Id. at tit. VI, § 601, 103 Stat. at 1319. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence
S. Eagleburger was selected to coordinate the SEED Program by President Bush. Fo-
cus on Central and Eastern Europe, 1 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. 214, 214 (1990).
166. SEED, supra note 3, at tit. VI, §§ 602-603, 103 Stat. at 1319.
167. Id. at tit. VII, §§ 701-706, 103 Stat. at 1320-21. These include reports on
Poland's requirement for agricultural assistance, on confidence building measures being
undertaken to promote investment and trade, and on environmental problems. Id. at tit.
VII, §§ 701-703, 103 Stat. at 1320-21.
168. Id. at tit. VIII, § 801, 103 Stat. at 1322.
169. Id. It is unclear whether or not Congress' use of the word "should" actually
requires the President to terminate assistance in such circumstances; however, the
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V. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SEED PROGRAMS
Based upon its interpretation of the Act's mandates, the Bush Ad-
ministration undertook a number of activities to implement SEED's di-
rectives following its enactment. 170 The Administration redefined U.S.
assistance policy to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.
17 1
Rooted in SEED's statement of objectives, the State Department an-
nounced that assistance would be provided to those countries that are
moving towards a "new democratic differentiation." 172 The nations
would receive aid based on their individual needs for the attainment of
four United States objectives:
First, progress toward political pluralism, based on free
and fair elections and an end to the monopoly of the communist
party;
Second, progress toward economic reform, based on the
emergence of a market-oriented economy with a substantial pri-
vate sector;
Third, enhanced respect for internationally recognized
human rights, including the right to emigrate, and to speak and
travel freely; and
Fourth, a willingness on the part of each of these countries
to build a friendly relationship with the United States.
173
The State Department established a new framework for U.S. aid en-
compassing the three types of assistance incorporated in SEED. 74
House Report states that "[the] bill conditions . . .assistance on continued steps to-
ward democracy and market-oriented economies through the implementation of com-
prehensive economic reform in both Poland and Hungary." HOUSE REPORT, pt. 1,
supra note 103, at 2, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 745.
170. Kenneth I. Juster, Remarks before RAND Corporation Conference on Sup-
porting East European Democracy and Free Markets (Sept. 21, 1990) in 1 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH. 214 (1991).
171. Id.
172. Id. Previously, contact with and assistance to the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean nations was directly proportionate to the extent of each country's variance from
Soviet foreign policy. Id. At the time of these remarks, the administration had explic-
itly recognized four countries as being qualified to receive support under this new defi-
nition: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Of these four, Poland was
deemed to be the top priority because of its size, the severity of its problems, and the
breadth of its proposed reforms. Id. at 216.
173. Id. at 214.
174. Id.
DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1989
First, short-term humanitarian assistance would be provided in the
form of medical supplies and food relief.175 Second, medium-term assis-
tance would be offered, such as guidance in the development of demo-
cratic institutions, technical assistance to support the transition to a
market economy, environmental assistance, and involvement in the ne-
gotiation of agreements to normalize trade relations. 17 6 The final level
of assistance would be through bilateral and multilateral economic sup-
port in the form of contributions to IMF stabilization funds, the Polish
Stabilization Fund, World Bank structural adjustment programs, and
the establishment of the Polish-American Enterprise Fund. 17
These interpretations and resultant actions, however, have had a
mixed impact. Some of the largest programs in terms of financial com-
mitments have caused the least controversy and have been fairly suc-
cessful in the achievement of their objectives. For example, the estab-
lishment of the multi-lateral Polish stabilization fund has largely
achieved full convertibility of the zloty in the international currency
markets.' There is also little debate that the United States' decision
to forgive a substantial portion of Poland's official government debt
substantially reduced pressure on Poland's economy. 179 Polish policies
also have succeeded in spurring private entities to a 20% annual
growth rate.'80 Now, more than 90% of retail operations are in private
firms, and lines have disappeared at shops whose shelves are filled with
food and consumer goods.''
Despite these successes, there have been substantial problems in
the Polish economy. The overall purchasing power of Polish citizens has
declined by over a third."8 2 Unemployment has increased two-fold dur-
ing the past year to a current rate approaching 12% .181 Polish average
annual income is only $200, yet Warsaw office space costs more than
rents in Manhattan."8 In response to IMF requirements, the Warsaw
175. Id.
176. Id. at 214-15.
177. Id. at 215-16.
178. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 93, § 3.5.
179. Id. § 2.4.
180. Blaine Harden, Poles Led the Way but Have Far to Go; 'Shock" Plan is
Moscow Model, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Shock Plan].
181. Id. See also Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 93, § 3.7 (noting that the pri-
vate sector contribution to overall GDP is now estimated at 22-23%).
182. Shock Plan, supra note 180, at Al.
183. Blaine Harden, Poles Sour on Capitalism, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1992, at Al,
A24 [hereinafter Poles Sour on Capitalism].
184. Id.
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government is being forced to impose drastic budget cuts.185 The gov-
ernment also has announced substantial increases in energy prices.
186
Officials within U.S. agencies have criticized the SEED program,
as interpreted and implemented by the top levels of the Bush Adminis-
tration, since medium-term transition aid may only consist of technical
assistance and private investment. 87 For example, AID officials criti-
cize SEED's overly specific programmatic directives because they
would prefer more general statements of goals and objectives. 188 This
criticism stems from the belief that the Act "mandated solutions to
problems that were poorly defined and understood."' 8 Such excessively
specific directives have created considerable inter-agency friction. For
example, the Act directed the Department of Energy to retrofit a Kra-
kow commercial power plant with "clean coal" technology. 9 ' Depart-
ment of Energy officials sought to implement the program, yet believed
that State Department, AID, and EPA officials undermined Polish sup-
port for the program, which led to mixed results. 9 ' These officials
noted that Polish officials were too "fragmented" and "overwhelmed"
by donors. 92 However, a State Department official countered that the
Polish government did not want to commit its own resources to the
project in the face of more pressing needs. 193
The language of the Act also presented considerable difficulties to
agency officials because it requires support of private sector initiatives
to the exclusion of the recipient country's public sector. For example,
the Department of Commerce was to provide technical assistance to
promote trade and investment opportunities.19 ' Noting that the Act's
restrictions clash with Eastern Europe's reality, one Commerce official
was paraphrased as saying that: "[a] huge portion of Poland's economy
consists of state-owned enterprises which the U.S. government cannot
work with to improve operations and, thus, their impact on the local
185. Mary Battiata, Poles Strike Against Economic Reforms; Price Increases,
Proposed Budget Cuts Anger Public Suffering from Unemployment, WASH. POST, Jan.
13, 1992, at A13.
186. Id.
187. See generally U.S. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EASTERN EUROPE: STATUS
OF U.S. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS, PUB. No. GAO/NSIAD-91-110, at 1 (1991) (describing
critiques of program made by agency officials) .[hereinafter U.S. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS].
188. Id. at 23.
189. Id.
190. SEED, supra note 3, § 502(f)(1), 103 Stat. at 1318.
191. U.S. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS, supra note 187, at 30.
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economy." 1"5 Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) officials
also made a similar criticism.' They would like to focus some of their
efforts on providing risk insurance to assist state-owned enterprises in
their privatization efforts; however, a strict reading of the Act prevents
them from taking such steps.' 9'
Finally, aside from the difficulties presented by the Act's provi-
sions, Polish officials have criticized the form and size of U.S. assis-
tance efforts. Polish President Lech Walesa unleashed a resounding
damnation of Western and, especially, U.S. assistance efforts, before a
February 1992 meeting of the Council of Europe: "It is you, the West
who have made good business on the Polish revolution .... The West
was supposed to help us in arranging the economy on new principles,
but in fact it largely confined its effort to draining our domestic mar-
kets." '198 This criticism reflected a substantial change in Poland's public
mood pertaining to the transition to a market economy. One opinion
poll showed that only one in four Poles supported the conversion to a
market economy, and that a majority of the people were in favor of
aiding state-owned enterprises and were increasingly suspicious of for-
eign 'investment.199
These public pressures led to a substantial shift in Polish policies
that arguably ran counter to SEED's objectives. The government, led
in early 1992 by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, "centralize[d] eco-
nomic decision making, questioned the need for rigorous free market
reform, and pledged to aid money-losing state industries."200 The cur-
rent government, led by Hanna Suchocka, eliminated many of the Ols-
zewski attempts at retrenchment; nonetheless, her government is at-
tempting to balance IMF demands for stern fiscal and monetary policy
with the need to soften the blows of the Balcerowicz "shock therapy"
plan.20 1
Nonetheless, this retrenchment and criticism reflects a substantial
weakness of the SEED program structure that in the words of one com-
mentator, "is hurting America's image. 2 02 The technical assistance
195. Id. at 29.
196. Id. at 39.
197. Id.
198. Poles Sour on Capitalism, supra note 183, at Al.
199. Id. at A24 (citing a survey published in Poland's largest daily newspaper,
GAZETA WYBORCZA).
200. Id. at Al. Olszewski led the third government following the 1989 transition.
Id.
201. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 93, § 3.1.
202. Janine R. Wedel, Polish Officials Sour On US AID Approach, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 2, 1992, at 18.
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programs of SEED have led Poles to resent the so-called "Marriott
Brigade" of American consultants and other experts who exploit the
SEED program's resources to advance their personal business agen-
das.20 3 A major element of this criticism is that the consultants receive
the financial benefits while the Poles receive nothing but excessive ad-
vice that places strains on their already over-burdened schedules. 4
Another commentator suggests that "[tihe right response [to Walesa's
criticisms] is to return to all the questions about Western support for
Poland and to ask once again whether it is the right kind of help--and
whether there is enough of it."205
VI. CONCLUSION
The formulation and implementation of SEED is another chapter
in the disjointed development of United States foreign assistance pol-
icy. With the continuing conversion of Eastern Europe's political and
economic structures, a renewed consideration of U.S. international de-
velopment policy formulation is vital if we are to fulfill our role in the
post cold war environment. The story of Poland and SEED require that
Congress and the administration address four broad questions:
- To what extent should U.S. international development policies
drive recipient countries' domestic priorities?
• What is the proper relationship of the Executive and the Leg-
islative branches in the determination of international develop-
ment priorities?
- How should this relationship be reflected in future legislation
in order to effectively translate goals into effective policy?
* Is the existing structure for administering economic assistance
sufficient to address global needs in the post-cold war
environment?
The SEED- Act and the Administration's interpretation of its man-
date render U.S. assistance contingent upon the pursuit of free market
economic organization. The various actors in the process have a pleth-
203. Id. The "Marriott Brigade" refers to the consultants' habit of staying in lux-
ury hotels during their trips. Id.
204. Id.
205. Blunt Words from Lech Walesa, WASH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1992, at B6.
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ora of views regarding the definition of "free market." Thus, for exam-
ple, if Poland slows its progress toward economic conversion, will either
Congress or the Administration revoke its existing commitments, and
will threats of revocation be used to second-guess the Polish leadership
under the guise of "policy dialogue?" An equally fundamental question
is whether or not U.S. institutions should influence the development of
recipient country policies through its technical assistance, the content
of which is substantially determined by American domestic politics.
At the same time, consideration has to be given to determining
who properly should make these determinations and how they should
be made. For example, is it intelligent for Congress to direct Adminis-
tration policy through the use of earmarks and reporting requirements?
Does congressional micromanagement produce policies that miss the
mark for the attainment of its stated objectives? Yet, would the Ad-
ministration continually violate the intent of Congress if legislation
merely stated mandates in terms of broad objectives?
The attainment of congressional objectives, however stated, may
be lost if the administrative structure precludes the effective delivery of
assistance. For example, if Congress were to eliminate earmarks in
favor of broad objectives, would assistance be effectively administered
under the current regime that is supervised by the State Department?
If geopolitical considerations were to be downplayed and true need and
recipient country accountability to be emphasized, State Department
administration might prevent the criteria from being properly applied.
To the extent that other U.S. agencies are involved in assistance activi-
ties due to their comparative expertise advantages, should they be al-
lowed to pursue their activities independently or should they report to
some sort of "development czar?"
The answers to such questions are inevitably elusive, particularly
when the policy milieu is highly fluid as is the case with international
affairs. The point of this analysis is to urge a renewed consideration of
U.S. international development objectives and structures. While it is
important that U.S. assistance advance U.S. interests, it is equally im-
portant that its aid help rather than harm the recipient country. The
U.S. approach is not the only approach. As Secretary Baker said, we
can help through the sharing of our expertise; however, our expertise is
derived through our experience. As the Polish experience demonstrates,
unscrambling "omelets" requires patience, commitment and sensitivity.
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The United States owes the recipients of its assistance the benefit of an
intelligently designed policymaking structure that will balance priori-
ties in a way that will dispense assistance in a truly constructive
manner.
Howard A. Wolf-Rodda
